An email that looks exactly right
Two days before completion, the seller's email arrives: 'We have changed banks, please send the sale proceeds to this new account.' The email looks like it came from the seller. The signature is right. The case handler knows the rules, but they are busy, and the email thread is genuine up to that point.
In a well-run firm, the change is caught because the procedure requires a call to a number on file. But that depends on the case handler following it every time, and on the number being one the firm obtained independently.
Why bank detail checks are fragile
Conveyancing is a well-known target for payment fraud, because large sums move on predictable dates and details are exchanged by email. Most firms have a procedure. The weakness is that it is carried out by people, under time pressure, and recorded inconsistently.
Details come from several places: the client at instruction, the seller's conveyancer's completion information, the lender. Each can be intercepted or spoofed, and each should be checked, but the checks are often a note on the file saying 'verified by phone' without saying what number was called or who answered.
| Weak point | Risk |
|---|---|
| Details supplied by email | Email can be intercepted or spoofed |
| Call to a number from the same email | Verifies nothing |
| Change of details late in the file | Not treated differently from original details |
| Verification noted in free text | Hard to check that it was done properly |
What a gap in the check costs
The consequence of sending money to a fraudster is severe for the client and the firm, and it can be very hard to recover. Even without a loss, a near miss shakes confidence and takes a lot of partner time to investigate. Insurers and lenders take a close interest in how firms control this risk.
Case handlers also carry the worry, particularly on busy completion days.
How we build a verification step
- Details captured once: client bank details are collected through a secure form at instruction, not by email, and stored against the client with the date and route received.
- Source recorded: every set of details on the file records where it came from (secure form, completion information form, lender) and when.
- Checks: details are compared with any previous details for that client or firm, and checked through your account verification service where you use one.
- Change flag: any change to details after they were first recorded is flagged prominently, and the file cannot be marked ready for payment until the change has been through your procedure.
- Confirmation record: the case handler records how the details were confirmed (for example, a call to a number obtained independently, with the number, the person spoken to and the time), in structured fields rather than free text.
- Second check: before payment, a second person confirms that the verification steps were completed, if your procedure requires it.
These steps support your firm's controls and make them harder to skip. They do not remove the risk of fraud, and your procedure and staff judgement remain the main defence.
What changes for the team
Bank details arrive through a secure route more often and by email less often. Changes stand out instead of blending into the email thread. Verification is recorded in a way that shows exactly what was done. The payment step cannot be reached until the checks are complete.
Case handlers get a clear process to follow under pressure, and partners can see that it was followed.
Signs to look for
- Client bank details are often sent by email.
- Verification is recorded as a free-text note.
- Changes to bank details are not treated differently from originals.
- Nothing stops a payment being prepared before verification.
- You could not easily show how details on a past file were checked.